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PUNCTURING THE RICO BALLOON: THE
JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF THE 10b-5
PURCHASER-SELLER REQUIREMENT
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act' (RICO) in 1970 to enhance law enforcement capabilities in
combating organized criminal activity.' Recently,3 however, civil liti-
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Stat. 922 (1970) [hereinafter RICO] (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
2. RICO, supra note 1, 84 Stat. at 923 ("[Ihe purpose of this act [is] to seek the
eradication of organized crime ... by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime"). See Michael N. Glanz, Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Worka-
ble Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513 n.2 (1983) (stating that RICO's purpose is to
give law enforcement authorities more capable tools to battle organized crime). See also
In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1422 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (stating that the purpose of
RICO is "to quell the potence and persistence of organized crime").
Congress designed RICO to fight organized criminal conduct, not simply organized
crime. RICO does not per se illegalize membership in the mafia. Congress justifiably
feared that illegalizing mafia membership would be unconstitutional. See, eg., 116
CONG. REc. 35,343 (1970), cited with approval in Glanz, supra, at 1527 n.105 (declaring
that Congress tejected Senator Biaggi's proffered RICO amendment which would have
per se illegalized mafia membership); Andrew P. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation
Based upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities" 18 GA. L. REv. 43, 49 (1983) (stating that
the constitutional right to freedom of association created an obstacle to the passage of a
per se illegal organized crime membership law).
Congress also feared that organized crime elements would create ways to avoid a
specific "organized crime" provision and that prosecutors would have difficulty proving
mob membership. Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Deci-
sions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,742 at 93,736 (N.D. Ohio, June 11, 1982). As a
result of these concerns, Congress enacted a RICO statute which "make[s] ... viola-
tions dependent upon behavior, not status." United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127,
1136 (3d Cir. 1977). Congress included offenses "characteristic of organized crime,"
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gants4 have utilized RICO outside the context of organized crime to
bring securities fraud claims.' In the mid-1980's, for example, civil
not offenses committed "primarily by members of organized crime," as the predicate
offenses which form the substance of RICO. In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1429.
(quoting 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970)).
Therefore, Congress was aware that plaintiffs would bring RICO claims against non-
mafioso defendants. 583 F. Supp at 1429. During congressional debate, the following
colloquy occurred between the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Congressman
Celler, and the Attorney General of the United States, Mitchell:
CHAIRMAN: ... Is... [RICO] limited to so-called "organized crime" offenders
... ?
ATTORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL: It is not so limited, Mr. Chairman....
CHAIRMAN: Of Course, [RICO] is called the "organized crime" bill... [M]aybe
we should call [RICO] something else. I think it gives a misapprehension.
Organized Crime Controk Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals before Subcomm.
No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1970) [hereinafter
House Hearings]. See also G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context:
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 273 n.l 12 (1982).
Indeed, "[iut is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of the
commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses commonly com-
mitted by persons outside organized crime as well." John L. McClellan, The Organized
Crime Act (S. 30) Or Its Critics." Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 55, 143 (1970) (the author of this article, who was a co-sponsor of RICO, re-
sponding to critics of the statute's broad reach).
In sum, Congress did not enact RICO specifically to fight organized crime, but
rather to fight organized criminal conduct by "any person." 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
3. Civil plaintiffs did not begin using RICO until the mid-1980s. See Jeffrey G.
Macintosh, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Powerful New Tool of
the Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 KAN. L. REv. 7, 11 (1982) (noting that few RICO
securities fraud cases existed before 1982); Glanz, supra note 2, at 1517 (same); Louis C.
Long, Treble Damages for Violations of Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis
and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DIcK. L. REV. 201,209-10 (1981)
(suggesting that plaintiff's lawyers lacked confidence in RICO because of early set-
backs in RICO claims).
4. RICO's substantive provision, § 1962, is a criminal provision and § 1963(a) pro-
vides an express criminal cause of action. Congress added a civil enabling provision,
§ 1964, in order to increase deterrence and facilitate criminal enforcement of the stat-
ute. Bridges, supra note 2, at 44. Congress gave private litigants a civil remedy to
encourage them to serve as private prosecutors. Id. at 44 n.10 (citing Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972)). See infra notes 161-69 for a discussion of the
importance of the role of private litigants in enforcing RICO.
5. See, eg., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989) (bankruptcy
fraud); Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d. 1342 (3d Cir. 1989)
(pro-life demonstrators), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989); Saporito v. Combustion En-
gineering Inc., 843 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1988) (employee benefit suits); Yellow Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(labor-management disputes); Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1987) (against
local governments); Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (retirement home
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securities fraud litigation involving RICO claims dramatically in-
creased.6 The increase of this use of RICO in securities litigation has
caused great concern throughout the legal7 and business communities.'
Courts have generally responded to this concern by narrowly interpret-
ing RICO's securities fraud provision to limit civil cases brought under
RICO.9
rip-off); Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (wrongful discharge); FMC
Corp. v. Boesky, 673 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (takeover battles); Nelson v. Bennett,
662 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (against accounting firms); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626
F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986) (sexual harassment). See generally Thomas F. Harrison,
Look Who's Using RICO, 75 A.B.A. J. 56 (Feb., 1989) for a survey of various causes of
action under RICO.
See also Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (stating that "[t]he fact that
[civil RICO] is used against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of spe-
cifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the
provision is being misconstrued"); Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust
Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[Tlhe fact that RICO has been applied in
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It
demonstrates breadth.").
6. See supra note 5 for a discussion of the onset of securities fraud litigation in the
1980's under RICO.
7. The American Bar Association has been a vocal critic of RICO. See, eg., Nancy
Blodgett, Revamping RICO: Congress gets into the act, 71 A.B.A. J. 32 (Dec., 1985)
(stating that the ABA Criminal Justice Section supports RICO amendment legislation);
Paul Marcotte and Nancy Blodgett, RICO, Rights Top ABA Agenda: Delegates urge
federal racketeering law cutback, 72 A.B.A. J. 28 (Oct. 1, 1986) (noting that an ABA
House of Delegates passed a resolution supporting an amendment that would limit the
scope of RICO); Rhonda McMillion, Push for RICO Reform Continues, 76 A.B.A. J.
109 (April, 1990) (noting that the ABA President and ABA Special RICO Coordinat-
ing Committee chairman urge Congress to limit the reach of RICO); Rhonda A.
McMillion, ABA Urges RICO Reform, 74 A.B.A. J. 147 (Oct. 1, 1988) (stating that the
ABA endorsed the efforts of several Congressmen to reform RICO); Debra C. Moss,
Plaintiffs Going For Broke(r): Investor suits against stockbrokers on the increase, 73
A.B.A. J. 18 (May 1, 1987) (noting that suits by investors against stock brokers are on
the rise partially because of the increased use of RICO).
Even in the Supreme Court, RICO has detractors. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501
(Marshall, J. dissenting) (finding that Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to use RICO
in ordinary commercial litigation); Paul Marcotte, Rehnquist: Cut Jurisdiction, Chief
Justice Outlines Reform Proposals in ABA Speech, 75 A.B.A. J. 22 (April, 1989) (noting
that Chief Justice Rhenquist recommended that Congress limit the availability of pri-
vate civil RICO actions).
8. Bridges, supra note 2, at 47 (stating that "[r]ecent litigation under RICO has
produced strong reaction from the commercial sector and businessmen... are now
beginning to take [RICO] seriously") (footnote omitted).
9. Courts have utilized numerous methods in limiting RICO's applicability. Some
of these methods include: (I) requiring plaintiffs to show an affiliation with organized
crime; (2) requiring the plaintiff's injury to result from the illegal competitive advan-
tages arising from the defendant's racketeering; or (3) requiring plaintiffs to prove an
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In 1990, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
follow this narrow interpretation of the RICO securities fraud provi-
sion. The court in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman " re-
fused to limit standing to sue11 under the RICO securities fraud
provision to purchasers or sellers of securities, 12 as required by Section
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act13 and its companion Rule
lOb-514 (hereinafter collectively referred to as lOb-5).
injury "by reason of" a RICO violation. Glanz, supra note 2, at 1526-33 (stating that
"the very breadth and vagueness of the RICO statute suggest that the courts assume
some control . . . in civil actions"). See Spencer Cos., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car,
[1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 98,361, at 92,217 (D. Mass. Nov.
17, 1981). Glanz, supra note 2, at 1526-1533.
The Supreme Court, however, has repudiated lower court efforts to impose limiting
standards on RICO.
It is true that private civil actions under ... [RICO] are being brought almost
solely against [commercial] defendants, rather than against the archetypal, intimi-
dating mobster. Yet this defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress. It is not for the judiciary to
eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it....
Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) (footnote omitted).
10. 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part sub nom. Holmes v. SIPC,
113 L.Ed.2d 716 (1991).
11. Commentators and courts use the phrases "standing to sue" and "state a cause
of action" interchangeably when discussing whether the RICO securities fraud predi-
cate offense contains a lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation. See Glanz, supra note 2, at
1518 n.34 (noting that although the Supreme Court has used the terms "standing" and
"cause of action" interchangeably at times, the Court has also suggested that the two
should be distinguished). In this Note, the term "standing" generally refers to whether
a given plaintiff can maintain a civil RICO action.
12. 908 F.2d at 1465-67.
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10B-5 (1991). The text of Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
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This Note argues that courts should not limit RICO securities fraud
claims by imposing the lOb-5 purchaser-seller standing requirement.
Part I of this Note discusses the background, text, and legislative his-
tory of RICO. Part II discusses lOb-5 and its standing requirement.
Part III discusses the case law on RICO securities fraud. Finally, Part
IV analyzes the case law and argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly
ruled that the lOb-5 purchaser-seller requirement does not limit stand-
ing to bring a RICO securities fraud claim.
I. THE RICO SECURITIES FRAUD PREDICATE ACTION
A. General Background of RICO
Despite numerous criticism and objections,15 Congress phrased the
RICO provisions broadly.1 6 Moreover, Congress reinforced the broad
language by placing a liberal construction provision directly in the stat-
ute for courts to follow.17 The Supreme Court recognizes the liberal
construction clause and interprets civil RICO broadly in compliance
with Congress' mandate. 8
In addition, Congress created many new procedural advantages for
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated Rule lOb-5 pursuant to its
authority under § 10(b). See supra note 13 for the text of § 10(b).
15. See infra note 46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative his-
tory of RICO and criticism of RICO during congressional debate on the bill.
16. In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1423 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that "[t]rue to
its word, Congress formulated a broad statute"). See also Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cit. 1984) (stating that
"Congress deliberately chose the very broad language of RICO's provisions... [such
that] the proponents and opponents of RICO recognized the extraordinary breadth of
its terms"); Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets:
The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 896, 926
(1990) (RICO has "unduly broad and facially clear language") [hereinafter Mathews,
RICO in Securities Litigation]. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the purposes of
RICO and the reasons behind its broad construction.
17. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 9-452,
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) provides: "[t]he provisions of this title shall be liber-
ally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
18. See, e.g., Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,492 n.10 (stating that "if Congress'
liberal construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964, where RICO's
remedial purposes are most evident").
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criminal prosecutors under RICO. 9 Civil RICO litigants also re-
ceived extensive procedural advantages including treble damages,2' at-
torney's fees,2 1 liberal discovery, permissive venue,22 nationwide
service of process23 and expedited trial dates.24 Congress' broad draft-
ing and expansive provisions produced a "powerful tool, 25 which both
civil litigants and criminal prosecutors could use to attack alleged
RICO violators.
B. The Statutory Language
Securities fraud plaintiffs can bring civil RICO claims under
§ 1964(c).26 Under § 1964(c), any person injured "by reason of" a vio-
lation of criminal RICO, § 1962,27 has standing to bring a civil claim
under RICO.28 To incur criminal liability under RICO, § 1962(c)2 9
requires a "pattern"30 of "racketeering activity"'" by a defendant in-
19. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1988) (allowing prosecutors to seize illegal
profits from RICO violators); 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1988) (allowing the Attorney General
to demand evidence from defendants).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). See infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the importance of civil litigants to RICO's enforcement.
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1965.
23. Id. § 1965(c) and (d).
24. Id. § 1966.
25. MacIntosh, supra note 3, at 7 (concluding that RICO is a "powerful new tool"
for defrauded securities plaintiffs).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) reads in pertinent part:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
I
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988) proscribes four general activities.
28. See supra note 26 for the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
Civil RICO claimants rely upon the same substantive provision as criminal prosecutors.
Thus, "RICO provides the only civil action where the defendant pleads 'not guilty.'"
Bridges, supra note 2, at 44. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the reasons behind this dichotomy.
29. 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) (1988) mandates:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988) defines a "pattern of racketeering activity" as: "at
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volved in an "enterprise." 2 Section 1961(1)(A)-(D) defines "racke-
teering activity" as a violation of any of the listed federal or state
crimes, labeled predicate offenses.33 One predicate offense listed in
§ 1961 is "[flraud in the sale of securities."3 4
Under the statute's plain language, "any person injured" 3 by reason
of "fraud in the sale of securities' 3 6 "may sue",37 under RICO.38 Un-
like most other listed predicate offenses, RICO's securities fraud provi-
sion does not refer to a specific statute. For example, most of the listed
predicate offenses in § 1961 refer to other federal statutes containing
the predicate offense's standing requirements and prima facie ele-
ments.39 However, Congress failed to list any statutory references
enumerating the standing requirements for the RICO securities fraud
offense.' Thus, courts look to the legislative history of the securities
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) divides "racketeering activity" into five major cate-
gories: (A) specific state law crimes, (B) specific federal crimes, (C) federal labor
crimes, (D) miscellaneous crimes, including drug offenses and "fraud in the sale of se-
curities," and (E) "any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Trans-
action Reporting Act."
32. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988), an "enterprise" includes "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
33. Bridges, supra note 2, at 45 n. 11. The offenses are labeled "predicate" in that
they constitute the necessary foundation for a RICO violation. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1988).
35. Id. § 1964(c).
36. Id. § 1961(l)(D).
37. Id. § 1964(c).
38. In evaluating a statute, courts must first look "to its language." United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (holding that an "enterprise" under RICO encom-
passes both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises).
39. Most predicate offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) contain statutory references, i.e.,
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (relating to mail fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (relating to wire fraud).
Courts utilize these statutory references to determine standing and the prima facie ele-
ments of the RICO predicate offense. See Bridges, supra note 2, at 59 (stating that
"fraud in the sale of securities" lacks the specific references to offenses that the other
predicate crimes provide).
40. Mathews, RICO in Securities Litigation, supra note 16, at 944 (stating that the
securities fraud predicate offense contains no reference to any title of the United States
Code or federal securities statutes).
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fraud offense in order to define its standing requirements.4 1
C. The Legislative History42
RICO's legislative history offers little guidance interpreting the se-
curities fraud predicate offense.43 The early drafts of RICO did not
include the securities fraud offense 4 because Congress did not add the
41. See infra note 145 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appropriate-
ness of looking to legislative history in the RICO securities fraud context.
42. Congress had contemplated creating a comprehensive crime statute such as
RICO for a considerable amount of time prior to RICO's adoption in 1970. For
example, in the 1930's, hearings conducted by Senator Royal S. Copeland first brought
the problem of organized crime and racketeering under national scrutiny. Blakey, supra
note 2, at 249 n.35. In the 1950's, the Special Committee to Investigate Organized
Crime in interstate commerce (the Kefauver Committee) examined various proposals to
combat organized crime. Id. at 249. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (the Katzenbach Commission) released
a detailed study outlining the pervasive influence of organized crime in American
society. Id. at 251-53. This study significantly influenced the National Commission on
the Reform of the Federal Criminal Law (Brown Commission) which created and
sponsored RICO throughout the congressional enactment process. Id. at 253-58.
43. See, e.g., Mathews, RICO in Securities Litigation, supra note 16, at 944 (arguing
that "RICO's legislative history does not reveal whether Congress had one or more
particular provisions of the federal securities laws in mind when it crafted [the securities
fraud] predicate offense"). See also Bridges, supra note 2, at 58 (identifying four possi-
ble interpretations of the securities fraud offense); MacIntosh, supra note 3, at 29 (con-
tending that RICO's legislative history is not helpful in defining the boundaries of the
securities fraud offense).
44. In 1967, Senator Roman L. Hruska introduced bills S. 2048 and S. 2049. These
bills contained aspects of the Katzenbach Committee recommendations that the new
crime statute utilize antitrust theories to combat organized crime. Blakey, supra note 2,
at 253-54. The bills, even at this early stage, covered legitimate businesses in addition to
organized crime. Id. at 254 n.48. They did not, however, contain a securities fraud
predicate action.
In 1969, Senator McClellan introduced S. 30, the Organized Crime Control Act. Id.
at 256. To accompany his proposal, Senator McClellan spoke at length about organized
criminal conduct in business, government and unions. Id. Later in 1969, Senator
Hruska introduced S. 1623, the Criminal Activities Profits Act which synthesized previ-
ous crime bills. Id. at 258-61. Interestingly, Hruska considered S. 1623 to be primarily
a civil statute as evidenced by S. 1623's provisions for private equitable relief and treble
damages. Id. at 261. However, neither S. 30 nor S. 1623 contained a securities fraud
provision. Glanz, supra note 2, at 1536.
Finally, on April 18, 1969, Senator McClellan introduced S. 1861, the Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act. Blakey, supra note 2, at 262. S. 1861 did not originally contain provi-
sions for private equitable relief or treble damages. Id. Then, during senate hearings on
S. 30, Robert Haack, President of the New York Stock Exchange, testified to the perva-
siveness of theft and fraudulent resale of securities in the securities exchanges. Glanz,
supra note 2, at 1537-38. See also Arthur F. Mathews, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO
Task Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. CORP. BANKING & Bus. L. 100 [hereinafter Mathews,
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provision until its final draft." During congressional debate, interest
groups criticized the broad reach of the securities fraud provision"
while congressmen warned of the similarly broad impact of RICO
"racketeering activity."'47 Therefore, Congress was fully aware of the
Ad Hoc Task Force]. Thus, when the bill came out of committee for final vote by the
Senate, it contained the securities fraud provision. Glanz, supra note 2, at 1539.
The Senate passed S. 30 with the securities fraud provision; however, S. 30 lacked a
treble damages provision. Mathews, supra, at 106. The bill then went to the House for
final vote. During House debate on S. 30, the House added a treble damages provision.
Id. at 119-20. Also, during House debate, critics of RICO offered extensive testimony
against the statute. Id. at 116-19. See infra notes 46-47 for a discussion of the critics'
testimony. The House overwhelmingly passed the bill complete with a treble damages
provision and a securities fraud provision. The Senate concurred on the resulting bill
without conference. Blakey, supra note 2, at 279-80.
45. See supra note 44 for a historical overview of the enactment of the securities
fraud provision.
46. Even before the mail, wire and securities fraud provisions were added to RICO,
the Justice Department objected to RICO on the grounds that it was too broad. See
Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S.
1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, & 2022, S. 2122 and . 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 404-07
(1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. The Justice Department feared that RICO
"would result in a large number of unintended applications." Mathews, RICO in Securi-
ties Litigation, supra note 16, at 928 n.167 (citing Senate Hearings at 404-07).
During House debate, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY)
also objected to the broad reach of RICO, especially the securities fraud offense. Organ-
ized Crime Control, Hearings on S. 30 And Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of
The House Comm. on The Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 289 et. seq. (1970) [hereinafter
House Hearings], cited in Mathews, Ad Hoc Task Force, supra note 44, at 111. The
ABCNY testified that RICO "included as predicate offenses a number of criminal activ-
ities that were not characteristic[ ] ... of organized crime, e.g., securities fraud." Ma-
thews, Ad Hoc Task Force, supra note 44, at 111.
The New York County Lawyers Association also objected to the securities fraud
predicate offense during House debate. The Association stated:
[A]gainst the background of expanding securities regulation, this definition [fraud
in the sale of securities] could include the various officers, directors and employees
of corporations and underwriters of securities who have been found guilty of fraud
in the sale of securities in some of the recent Rule lOb-5 cases. Fraud in the sale of
securities is simply not synonymous with racketeering activity.
House Hearings, supra, at 401.
Finally, the American Civil Liberties Union also objected to RICO during the debate.
The ACLU objected to RICO on constitutional grounds because of the vagueness and
breadth of predicate offenses composing "racketeering activity." Mathews, Ad Hoc
Task Force, supra note 44, at 112 (citing House Hearings, at 499-501, 517-18).
47. Two influential members of Senate Judiciary Committee, Senators Edward M.
Kennedy and Philip A. Hart, objected to S. 30 during Senate debate because it went
"beyond organized criminal activity." Mathews, Ad Hoc Task Force, supra note 44, at
104. In addition, during House debate, Congressmen William F. Ryan, John Conyers,
Jr. and Abner Mikva also objected to RICO's broad reach. Blakey, supra note 2, at 276
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 41:193
potentially limitless reach of the securities fraud offense, yet refused to
explicitly include the lOb-5 purchaser-seller standing requirement in
RICO.
48
II. 10B-5 SECURITIES LAw 4 9
The purpose of the securities laws is to provide investors, both the
experienced and novice, with full and truthful disclosure of all material
information before making an investment decision.50 The Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), in accordance with its rulemaking pow-
ers and § 10(b), promulgated Rule lOb-5 to further this purpose.51
Originally used only as a prosecutorial tool of the SEC, courts have
implied a private cause of action under 10b-5.52
n.116 (citing H. R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 187 (1970)). These congressmen
objected to RICO because it failed to "make [a] discrete segregation of mobsters." Id.
Moreover, the congressmen objected to the treble damages provision, because it invited
"disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen engaging in in-
terstate commerce." Id.
48. Professor Robert Blakey, the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures during the creation and debate of RICO, concluded that
the legislative history of RICO dictates that "Congress deliberately extended RICO to
the general field of commercial and other fraud... and... Congress was well aware
that it was creating important new federal criminal and civil remedies in a field tradi-
tionally occupied by common law fraud." Blakey, supra note 2, at 280.
Conversely, the ABA Ad Hoe Task Force was not present during the creation and
debates on RICO. It examined the legislative history fifteen years after the Act's pas-
sage and concluded that "nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended to replace existing express and implied private damage causes of action under
the federal securities laws with the express RICO treble damage cause of action when-
ever two instances of mail, wire or securities fraud occurred in connection with a securi-
ties fraud transaction." Mathews, Ad Hoc Task Force, supra note 44, at 125-26.
49. General securities law is beyond the scope of this Note. A brief discussion of
10b-5 is necessary, however, to explain the origins of the purchaser-seller limitation.
Moreover, courts have borrowed the rationale of the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation
and applied it to RICO civil claims. See, eg., International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin,
812 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitations to
RICO securities fraud); Chief Consolidated Mining Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 725 F.
Supp. 1191, 1194 (D. Utah 1989) (same).
50. The purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was "to provide for the
regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets operating in inter-
state and foreign commerce and through the mails, [and] to prevent inequitable and
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975).
51. See supra notes 13-14 for the texts of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Commission
enacted Rule lOb-5 in 1942. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729.
52. Neither § 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 provide express civil remedies for a securities
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In the landmark case of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,53
the Supreme Court enumerated the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation. 54
The Court held that in order to have standing to bring a lOb-5 claim, a
plaintiff must actually purchase or sell securities.55 The Court limited
standing to sue under lOb-5 because of concern about the vexatious
litigation that would result from a broader class of plaintiffs.56
In the years since Blue Chip Stamps, courts have further refined the
lOb-5 purchaser-seller requirement to meet new factual situations.57
Much of this refinement has focused on the lOb-5 phrase "in connec-
tion with," and involved the nexus between the securities transaction
and the fraud. Courts have expanded lOb-5 standing by reading "in
connection with" as an "elastic nexus element."58 In essence, the "in
connection with" phrase permits plaintiffs to sue defendants even
where the defendant did not participate in an actual securities transac-
tion. 9 However, despite the elastic nature of this phrase, courts have
fraud violation. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729-30. In Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the district court first implied a private cause of
action in lOb-5. The court based its decision on general tort law, the remedial purposes
of the Act and § 29(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which deems voidable any
contract made in violation of the Act. Id. at 514. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), the court followed
Kardon; however, in accordance with 10b-5's language, the Birnbaum court limited
standing to sue under an implied cause of action to actual purchasers or sellers of secur-
ities. Id. at 463-64. The Supreme Court affirmed the Birnbaum rule in Superintendent
of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13.(1971).
53. 421 U.S. 723 (1974).
54. Id. at 749.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 740. The Blue Chip Stamps Court noted that the fear of vexatious litiga-
tion has two grounds. Id. The first is a concern that lawsuits will disrupt normal busi-
ness activity by making accusations of fraud designed to receive a large settlement. Id.
Secondly, by broadening the lOb-5 standing requirement, plaintiffs would have difficulty
demonstrating, and juries would have difficulty understanding, deceptive practices. Id.
at 743. The Court stated that without the purchaser-seller limitation:
[P]laintiff's proof would not be that he purchased or sold stock... but instead that
he decided not to purchase or sell stock. Plaintiff's entire testimony could be de-
pendent upon uncorroborated oral evidence of many of the crucial elements of his
claim, and still be sufficient to go to the jury.
Id. at 746.
57. See, eg., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74(1977) (limit-
ing lOb-5 causes of action to claims of manipulation or deception).
58. Mathews, RICO in Securities Litigation, supra note 16, at 945.
59. See, e.g., Norris v. Wirtz, 719 F.2d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1983); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
204 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 41:193
consistently interpreted lOb-5 to require that the plaintiff purchased or
sold securities based upon the defendant's fraudulent conduct. 60 Thus,
the rationale underlying the purchaser-seller limitation remains
steadfast, regardless of subtle changes.
Neither RICO's plain language nor its legislative history expressly
incorporates the lOb-5 standing limitation into RICO's securities fraud
provision. However, courts generally have read the lOb-5 standing
limitation into the RICO securities fraud provision. 61 Courts echo the
Blue Chip Stamps Court's concern over the danger of vexatious litiga-
tion when they engraft the lOb-5 standing limitation onto RICO secur-
ities fraud offenses.62
III. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER
LIMITATION IN RICO SECURITIES FRAUD
A. Introduction
Three judicial factions have addressed whether the RICO securities
fraud offense contains a lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation. The first fac-
tion applies the lOb-5 standing requirement to RICO securities fraud
and allows only purchasers or sellers of securities to bring suit.63  The
60. See generally ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE
lOb-5, § 38.01(d) (discussing inroads into the purchaser-seller limitation).
61. See, eg., International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.
1987) (applying the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation to RICO securities fraud); Chief
Consolidated Mining Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (D. Utah
1989) (same); Kravetz v. Brukenfeld, 591 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); see
also Lou v. Belzberg, 728 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (plaintiff has standing to bring
RICO claim where he alleges violations of § 13(d)); First Pacific Bancorp v. Bro, 847
F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff lacks standing to sue for RICO securities
fraud where his § 13(d) claim does not allege that he purchased or sold securities); but
cf Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a RICO securities fraud claim is not limited by the purchaser-seller re-
quirement); Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (1 1th Cir. 1987)
(same).
62. See infra notes 66-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts impos-
ing the lob-5 purchaser-seller limitation onto RICO securities fraud.
63. See, e.g., Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152 (stating in dicta that 10b-5 purchaser-seller
limitation applies to RICO securities fraud); Brannon v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041,
1043 (8th Cir. 1986) (dismissing a RICO claim because the plaintiffs failed to meet the
lob-5 purchaser-seller requirement); Chief ConsoL Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. at 1194
(holding that standing to sue under RICO is limited to actual purchasers or sellers of
securities); Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Res., Ltd., [1982 Decisions] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,738 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (holding that RICO
encompasses fraud in the purchase and sale of securities); Spencer Cos., Inc. v. Agency
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second faction further limits RICO securities fraud standing and relies
upon the literal language of RICO to grant standing only where the
defendant defrauds the plaintiff in the actual sale of securities." The
third faction rejects entirely the artificial limits on RICO securities
fraud and grants standing broadly.65
B. 1ob-5 Faction
In International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin,66 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in dicta, applied the lOb-5 standing requirement to
RICO securities fraud.6 7 In Zepkin, the defendants misrepresented
costs incurred in starting a company to a group of investors.68 The
investors gained control of the company and sued the defendants based
Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,361, at
92,215 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (same).
64. See In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. See. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668, 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that "fraud in the sale of securities" is limited to sale transaction fraud
only).
65. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1467
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that RICO does not require a plaintiff to be a purchaser or
seller of securities); Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (same); see
also Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1511 n.80 (11th Cir. 1991) (following Vigman
and stating that "the standing requirements of the securities laws do not apply to civil
RICO actions based upon predicate acts of securities fraud").
66. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 152. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant committed two violations of
lob-5. The plaintiff further claimed that these two lOb-5 violations satisfied the predi-
cate act requirement under RICO. Id. at 151. The Zepkin court determined that the
plaintiff's 10b-5 claims were defective because they were "in connection with" neither
the purchase nor the sale of securities. Id. at 152-54. Thus, because the plaintiffs pre-
mised their RICO claim on lOb-5 predicate acts, the court did not have to address
whether RICO securities fraud contains a standing limitation analogous to lob-5. Id. at
152. The court stated that "[w]e need not decide whether the term 'fraud in the sale of
securities'. . . merely incorporates by reference the standing provisions of securities
fraud statutes or whether it also limits of its own force RICO standing to the actual
parties to a sale." Id. at 152. Despite this qualification, the court addressed the issue in
depth and strongly suggested that RICO securities fraud standing is limited "of its own
force" by the lOb-5 standing limitation. Id. See, eg., Chief Consolidated Mining Co. v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (D. Utah 1989) (citing Zepkin for the
proposition that RICO securities fraud is limited by lOb-5 standing requirement).
68. 812 F.2d at 150. The defendants raised capital for their international trade
company through outside investors. Id. In the offering prospectus, the defendants
claimed they paid for certain equipment in advance. Id. Plaintiffs, ten outside inves-
tors, purchased stock in the company and subsequently contributed funds to repay the
defendants for their initial outlay. Id. Later, when the outside investors took over the
company, they discovered that defendants falsified these initial expenses. Id. at 150-51.
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upon two interrelated theories. First, the plaintiffs argued that the de-
fendants fraudulently induced payment in violation of lOb-5. 69 Sec-
ond, the investors claimed that the lOb-5 securities fraud constituted
RICO racketeering activity.70
The Zepkin court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
bring a 10b-5 claim because their reimbursement to defendants was not
a purchase or sale of securities.71 Because the plaintiffs predicated
their RICO claim on the facially deficient lOb-5 claim, the court found
the RICO claim similarly deficient.72 In dismissing the RICO claim,
however, the court discussed whether RICO securities fraud contains a
purchaser-seller limitation analogous to lOb-5.7 3
The court compared the language of § 1961(1)(D) of RICO with
Rule 10b-5's language74 and found that RICO's language "fraud in the
sale of securities" was narrower than lOb-5's language "fraud in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security."75 The court deter-
mined that the absence of both the word "purchase" and the phrase "in
connection with" from § 1961(l)(D) was significant.7 6 The court rea-
soned that Congress was aware of the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation
when it enacted RICO and concluded that Congress would not uncere-
moniously change that longstanding limitation. 7
69. Id. at 151.
70. Id. Plaintiffs claimed RICO securities fraud by alleging at least two violations
of the securities fraud predicate offense which could amount to racketeering activity
within the meaning of RICO. Id. However, the substantive violations were of lOb-5.
Id. at 152. Therefore, the court first examined the underlying lOb-5 securities claim
before reaching the RICO claim. Id. at 151. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the mechanics of RICO.
71. 812 F.2d at 151-52. The plaintiffs first purchased securities from the defend-
ants. Only later did the plaintiffs repay the defendants for the expenses fraudulently
listed in the offering prospectus. The two transactions were distinct and the repayment
did not involve securities. Id.
72. Id. at 151.
73. Id. at 152.
74. See supra notes 14 & 31 for the respective texts of lob-5 and § 1961(1)(D).
75. 812 F.2d at 152. The court stated that "[tihe statutory language... 'fraud in
the sale of securities' is ... narrow and suggests the pivotal role of the actual sales
transaction." Id. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text for a discussion com-
paring the language of RICO with that of lOb-5.
76. 812 F.2d at 152.
77. Id. Congress enacted RICO "against the developed backdrop of almost forty
years of federal securities law.... If Congress had intended the drastic result of over-
turning [the purchaser-seller limitation], it surely would have done so in a more explicit
way." Id.
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Although the court recognized that lOb-5 is a judicially-implied civil
cause of action, as opposed to RICO which is an express civil cause of
action, the court applied the rationale behind the lOb-5 purchaser-
seller limitation to RICO.7" The court opined that the danger of "vex-
atious litigation"79 is greater in RICO securities fraud claims than in
lOb-5 claims because of RICO's treble damage provision. 0
In Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co. ,8" the District
Court of Utah followed the Zepkin dicta 2 and held that RICO securi-
ties fraud standing is limited by lOb-5 standing requirements.8 3 In
Chief, the plaintiff sold mineral rights to the defendant in exchange for
royalties on the sale of ore mined at the site. 4 The defendant then filed
a stock prospectus representing that it would mine the property in the
near future.8 5 The plaintiff alleged that the prospectus was misleading
because the defendant never intended to mine the site.86 Therefore, the
plaintiff brought an action for securities fraud under both lOb-5 and
RICO.87
The Chief court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue
under RICO because they were neither purchasers nor sellers of securi-
ties.88 The court adopted the Zepkin court's interpretation of Con-
gress' intent when enacting RICO. 9 In addition, the Chief court
upheld the Zepkin court's policy rationale of preventing vexatious liti-
gation.' The court reasoned that RICO should not enable plaintiffs to
78. Id. at 153.
79. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
80. 812 F.2d at 153. The court reasoned that "[tihe larger potential recovery under
RICO enhances the 'settlement value' and 'nuisance' potential of a securities fraud ac-
tion." Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740-43).
81. 725 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Utah 1989).
82. Id. at 1194.
83. Id. The issue was one of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. Id.
84. Id. at 1192-93.
85. 725 F. Supp. at 1193.
86. Id. This misrepresentation would increase the value of the defendant's stock,
especially where, as here, the defendant represented the property as valuable. Id. at
1192-93.
87. Id. at 1193.
88. Id. at 1195.
89. 725 F. Supp. at 1194. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Zepkin.
90. 725 F. Supp. at 1194.
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contravene the longstanding lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation.91
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that RICO's civil
securities fraud must be interpreted consistently with the criminal se-
curities fraud provisions of RICO92 and lOb-5, both of which lack the
purchaser-seller requirement. 93 The court noted that the purchaser-
seller limitation in lOb-5 applies only to civil lOb-5 actions, not to
lOb-5 criminal actions.94 Therefore, the Chief court determined that
its limitation on civil RICO was consistent with existing securities
law.95
In Brannan v. Eisenstein,96 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also
applied the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation to RICO securities
fraud.97 However, the Eighth Circuit invoked a stricter limitation on
the RICO civil cause of action than either Chief or Zepkin. In Bran-
nan, the plaintiffs, directors of a petroleum company, alleged that the
defendants fraudulently induced98 the directors to sell interests in oil
and gas leases. 99 The court dismissed the directors' lb-5 claim be-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1194-95. The plaintiff noted that civil RICO utilizes the same substantive
offense, § 1961(1)(D), as criminal RICO. Id. at 1194. The plaintiff thus argued that,
since the language of criminal and civil RICO is the same, the language cannot be
interpreted one way in the criminal context and another way in the civil context. Id.
93. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of RICO crimi-
nal securities fraud and the purchaser-seller limitation.
94. 725 F. Supp. at 1195.
95. Id. The court cited Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984), where the court dismissed a civil RICO action for
lack of standing even though the defendant had been convicted criminally of RICO
securities fraud under the same allegations. 719 F.2d at 11-12. See infra notes 161-69
and accompanying text for a discussion of criminal versus civil RICO.
96. 804 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 1045-46.
98. Id. at 1043. The inducement was allegedly fraudulent because the defendants
purposely failed to inform the directors of a petroleum company that the interest must
be registered under Missouri blue sky laws prior to a sale. Id. The defendants allegedly
purchased the interest with knowledge of the Missouri laws. Id. Subsequent to the sale,
the defendants sued the directors in Missouri state court and sought to rescind the sale
of the oil and gas interests on the grounds that the sale violated the blue sky laws. The
defendants won this case and an appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Dunn v.
Bemor Petroleum, Inc., 680 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). As a result, the directors
suffered damages due to the rescission of the sale of the oil interests. 804 F.2d at 1043.
The directors then initiated this suit to recover damages from the rescission, alleging
that the rescission was part of a scheme to defraud their company. Id.
99. Id.
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cause they did not actually sell any securities." 0 Accordingly, the
court also dismissed the RICO securities fraud claim.101
Furthermore, the court dismissed the directors' RICO wire fraud
claim because "the same conduct cannot constitute a fraudulent
scheme giving rise to a wire fraud claim."10 2 Therefore, the Brannan
court held that, when allegedly fraudulent conduct fails the lOb-5
standing requirement, the same conduct cannot be the basis for an-
other predicate offense.103 In so holding, the court sought to prevent
the circumvention of the lOb-5 standing requirement. 1°4 Thus, the
Eighth Circuit implied that the lOb-5 purchaser-seller requirement lim-
its not only RICO securities fraud, but also all other RICO fraud
offenses. 105
C. Literal Language Faction
In In re Par Pharmaceutical Inc. Sec. Litig.,' °6 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York10 7 limited RICO
100. 804 F.2d at 1045. The court found that the directors did "not allege that they
were the actual sellers of the securities in question .... they simply allege[d] that the
state court held them to be sellers" of securities. Id. at 1046.
101. Id. The court reasoned that because it dismissed the securities fraud claim, the
directors cannot rely upon that conduct as the basis of a RICO claim. Id.
102. Id. at 1047. The court neither explained nor supported its holding with case
law. 6
103. Id. In other words, where fraudulent conduct does not amount to securities
fraud because the fraud was not "in connection with" a purchase or sale, that same
fraudulent conduct cannot amount to mail fraud or wire fraud. Id.
104. Id. See Mathews, RICO in Securities Litigation, supra note 16, at 948 (stating
that plaintiff cannot plead another predicate offense in order to "plug the standing
'loophole' in the securities fraud claim").
105. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals followed Brannan in Forkin v. Rooney
Pace, Inc., 804 F.2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1986). In Forkin, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants fraudulently failed to disclose that the securities which they sold to plaintiffs
were not registered for sale in Illinois. 804 F.2d at 1048-49. Similar to Brannan, the
transaction violated state securities law and ended in rescission. Id. at 1049. However,
in Forkin, the court held that the appellees' conduct was not manipulative or deceptive
under lob-5. Id. at 1050. Therefore, the court dismissed the lob-5 claim. Id. at 1051.
The court then followed Brannan and dismissed not only the appellants' securities fraud
claim, but also their wire and mail fraud claims. Id. "[O]ur finding with respect to the
federal securities law claims renders the RICO claims insufficient as a matter of law
because the appellants' allegations of racketeering activity are predicated on the same
conduct as the securities fraud claims." Id. at 1051.
106. 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
107. Courts in New York's southern district have been consistent on the issue
whether RICO securities fraud contains a lOb-5 limitation. In Kravetz v. Brukenfeld,
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securities fraud standing to an even more narrow class of plaintiffs than
the lOb-5 faction. The Par court held that RICO's literal language
limited RICO securities fraud standing to plaintiffs defrauded by the
defendants in the actual sale transaction. 0 8 In Par, a group of inves-
tors sued the board of directors of a drug manufacturing company for
violations of lOb-5 and RICO securities fraud." 9 The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants bribed Federal Drug Administration officials to
gain expedited approval of new drugs which, in turn, would increase
company profits.110 The plaintiffs purchased company stock in reli-
591 F. Supp. 1383, 1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), Judge Goetel concluded that a RICO securi-
ties fraud claim predicated on a 10b-5 violation requires fraud in the sale of securities.
Since the court dismissed the plaintiff's lOb-5 claim for lack of standing, the court dis-
missed the RICO claim as well. Id. at 1388, 1390. Apparently, the plaintiff neglected
to argue that RICO securities fraud lacks the purchaser-seller requirement, because the
court did not supply any rationale for its finding.
Similarly, in Par, Judge Patterson held that standing to sue under RICO securities
fraud is limited to fraudulent conduct committed by the defendant in actual sales trans-
actions. Par, 733 F. Supp. at 684. Six months after Par, in Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Icahn,
747 F. Supp. 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), Judge Patterson held that "[p]laintiff must have
been directly involved in either the purchase or sale of the securities in the Rule lOb-5
allegations to have standing under RICO to assert a Rule lOb-5 violation as a predicate
act of racketeering." Id. Interestingly, Judge Patterson did not cite Par in Viacom. Id.
Finally, in Beres v. Thomson McKinnon Sees., Inc., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,722 (S.D.N.Y. December 20, 1990), Judge Kram dismissed the
plaintiff's RICO securities fraud claim because the plaintiff neither purchased nor sold
secdrities. The court found the plaintiff's lob-5 claim deficient because the plaintiff had
not purchased securities, but assertedly lost "a mere.., opportunity to purchase securi-
ties." Id. at 98,403. The court dismissed the RICO securities fraud claim as a matter of
law because the lob-5 claim was deficient. Id. at 98,404. Beres thus follows Viacom
and Par because Beres suggests that a purchase or a sale of securities is sufficient to
allege a RICO securities fraud claim.
The consistency within the Southern District of New York is surprising, considering
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' squeamish treatment of the RICO standing issue
in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). In Moss, the court ex-
pressly deferred "this complex and far-reaching question" and did "not delineate
RICO's definition of 'fraud in the sale of securities." Id. at 18 n. 14. In Moss, the court
dismissed the private lob-5 cause of action against defendants criminally convicted
under lOb-5 in a previous decision, United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1981). The Moss court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue the defendant for
insider trading under lOb-5 because the defendants owed no duty of disclosure to the
plaintiff. Moss, 719 F.2d at 15. As a result, the court invalidated the RICO claim
without addressing the RICO standing issue. Id. at 19.
108. Par, 733 F. Supp. at 683-84.
109. Id. at 671-72. The plaintiffs also sued for violation of § 20(a) of the 1934 Se-
curities Exchange Act, common law fraud and deceit, and negligent misrepresentation.
Id. at 672.
110. Id. at 672-73. Par's Annual Report stated that "the ability of the Company to
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ance on the defendants' misrepresentations that "legitimate business
acumen" secured FDA approval.11
The Par court partially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the
lOb-5 claim.1" 2 However, the court sustained the defendants' motion
to dismiss the RICO securities fraud claim because the plaintiffs did
not allege that defendants sold securities.113 The court focused on the
plain language of § 1961(1)(D), "fraud in the sale of securities." '1 14
The Par court reasoned that the absence in RICO of any lOb-5 lan-
guage, including "purchase" or "in connection with," indicated that
Congress intended to limit RICO securities fraud to fraud which oc-
curs in actual sales transactions. 1 5 Thus, the court concluded that the
elastic "in connection with" clause is inapplicable to RICO securities
fraud. 116  This conclusion significantly narrowed RICO securities
continually introduce new products as quickly as possible... is essential to the mainte-
nance of its gross profit margins." Id. at 672 n.4.
111. Id. at 673.
112. 733 F. Supp. at 679. The court d;smissed the lOb-5 claim that the defendants
misled the plaintiffs by failing to disclose a pending Justice Department investigation
into the bribery scheme. Id. at 678. The court found that the defendants' failure to
speculate about the outcome of the investigation was not misleading within the meaning
of lOb-5. Id. The court stated that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial, however, to
prove their lOb-5 claim that the defendants lied about their success in obtaining FDA
approvals. Id. at 679.
113. Id. at 684.
114. The court stated that "[b]y the plain language of § 1961(l)(D), securities fraud
is only a predicate offense if the fraud occurs in the actual sale of a security." Id. at 683.
115. Id. The court found that:
It is reasonable to assume that Congress, had it wanted to make the RICO predi-
cate acts coextensive with § 10(b), would have used the same or similar language
in § 1961(l)(D) that it used in § 10(b). Had Congress intended RICO to be co-
extensive with § 10b, it certainly knew how to do so.
Id.
116. 733 F. Supp. at 684. The Par court concluded that:
The "in connection with" language provides standing only to plaintiffs who have
either purchased or sold securities, but it does not limit liability to defendants who
sold or bought from the plaintiffs. Thus, under the "in connection with" require-
ment, a defendant may be held liable even though he was not a party to a securities
transaction. This concept arose directly out of the "in connection with" language.
The language in § 1961(l)(D) - "fraud in the sale of securities" - is much less
susceptible to such an interpretation, and to stretch the language so far in the ab-
sence of any evidence that Congress intended such a result would be an act of
judicial legislation.
Id. at 683-84.
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fraud standing beyond lOb-5 limits.117
D. Broad Application Faction
In Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman,118 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals interpreted RICO broadly and held that RICO
securities fraud is not subject to the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limita-
tion." 9 In Vigman, the defendant allegedly manipulated stock prices
by issuing misleading press releases, 20 purchasing large blocks of
stock and selling the stock in small lots, 21 and parking stock in his
account. 12 2 The plaintiff123 asserted a RICO securities fraud claim
based upon violations of 10b-5. 24 The district court dismissed the
plaintiff's RICO claim because plaintiff did not meet the lOb-5
117. See supra note 58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elastic "in
connection with" clause from lOb-5.
118. 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part sub nom. Holmes v. SIPC,
111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
119. Id. at 1467. The Ninth Circuit is not the only court to hold that RICO securi-
ties fraud is not limited by the lob-5 purchaser-seller limitation. In Warner v. Alexan-
der Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals also held that RICO securities fraud is not subject to the purchaser-seller limi-
tation. In Warner, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
lOb-5 claim on the grounds that the alleged fraud did not occur "in connection with" a
purchase or sale of securities. Id. at 1530. However, with respect to the plaintiff's
RICO securities fraud claim, the court found that "RICO ha[d] no requirement analo-
gous to the 'purchase or sale' requirement of the federal securities laws." Id. The court
further stated that a plaintiff need only show injury resulting from the RICO violation.
Id. See also Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1511 n.80 (11th Cir. 1991) (relying on
Vigman finding that RICO securities fraud is not limited to purchaser-seller limitation).
120. 908 F.2d at 1464. The defendant allegedly issued false and misleading press
releases about new products his firm was preparing to market. Id.
121. Id. Through his actions, defendant allegedly created an appearance of an ac-
tive trading market for the stock. Id.
122. Id. "Parking" is a manipulative device which circumvents the net capital re-
quirements of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Id. at 1464 n.4.
NASD requires brokerage firms to fie monthly reports of their net capital and to dis-
count in value any stock the firm has in its own account. Id. To circumvent this dis-
count requirement, a brokerage firm allegedly "parked" stock in the defendant's
account by selling the stock to the defendant at market price and then buying it back
after filing the NASD report. Id.
123. The plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation composed of registered brokers and
dealers. Id. at 1463. Congress created the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC) in 1970 to provide more effective protection to customers of brokers and dealers
and members of national securities exchanges. Id.
124. Id. at 1464.
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purchaser-seller requirement for standing.12 5 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and held that the lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation
does not apply to RICO claims based on alleged securities fraud under
10b.5.126
The Vigman court first examined the standing issue by comparing
the language of the RICO securities fraud offense with that of lOb-5.127
The court found that, on its face, RICO securities fraud did not require
a plaintiff to be a purchaser or seller.1 2 In contrast, the court noted
that lOb-5 securities fraud is expressly limited to fraud "in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities." 129
In addition, the court distinguished RICO from lOb-5, noting that
RICO securities fraud is an express civil cause of action, whereas lOb-5
is a judicially implied cause of action.1 30 The court reasoned that,
while the Supreme Court has imposed judicial limitations on the im-
plied lOb-5 cause of action,131 the Court has explicitly declined to limit
express causes of action.1 32
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress intended courts to
interpret RICO broadly.133 The court noted that Congress purposely
worded RICO broadly 34 by including a liberal construction provision
in RICO which mandated an "expansive approach" to judicial inter-
pretation.1 35 Thus, pursuant to the text of § 1964(c), the Vigman court
granted standing to sue to "any person injured in his business or prop-
125. 908 F.2d at 1465.
126. Id. at 1467.
127. In beginning its statutory analysis, the court first looked to the plain language
of RICO. Id. at 1466.
128. Id. "Any plaintiff who is injured 'by reason of' fraud in the sale of securities
may sue [under RICO]." Id.
129. 908 F.2d at 1466.
130. Id.
131. Id. The court cited Blue Chip Stamps as the seminal case imposing the
purchaser-seller limitation on lOb-5 private actions. See supra notes 53-56 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Blue Chip Stamps.
132. 908 F.2d at 1466. The court noted that it is inappropriate for a court to im-
pose a standing requirement because it disagrees with Congress "about the wisdom of
creating so expansive a liability." Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 748-49).
133. 908 F.2d at 1466.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Vigman court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima,
S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). "RICO is to be read broadly. This is the
lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive language and overall approach,
but also of its express admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally construed to effectuate its
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erty by reason of" securities fraud.136
IV. ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW
A. The Plain Language of RICO
When interpreting RICO, courts first examine the plain language of
the statute. 137 The express language of the RICO securities fraud
predicate offense lacks a purchaser-seller standing limitation.138 In
RICO, Congress granted standing to bring a securities fraud claim to
"any person injured... by reason of",139 "fraud in the sale of securi-
ties." This broad definition of standing does not include any refer-
ence to the purchaser-seller requirement." 1 Courts that limit RICO
securities fraud standing to sue by including a purchaser-seller require-
ment disregard RICO's express standing provision. 42
remedial purposes."' Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98 (citation omitted) (quoting RICO,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970)).
136. 908 F.2d at 1466 (quoting RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988)). In Bennett v.
Centerpoint Bank, 761 F. Supp. 908, 914 (D.N.H. 1991), the district court noted that
the Vigman court's holding does not grant standing to anyone to bring a RICO securi-
ties fraud claim. Rather, the court stated that Vigman requires the plaintiff to show
injuries "by reason of" the securities fraud. Id In Bennett, the court did not rule on
whether the purchaser-seller requirement limits RICO securities fraud. Instead, the
court dismissed the plaintiff's RICO securities fraud claim because the plaintiff's inju-
ries were not caused "by reason of" the defendant's alleged securities fraud. Id. at 915.
Similarly, in Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1510 n.80, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that Vigman does not grant open-ended standing to plaintiffs.
Instead, "someone, even if not the civil RICO plaintiff, must have been a purchaser or
seller of securities" for the predicate act to have actually occurred. Id.
137. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 ("The language of the statute
... [is] the most reliable evidence of [Congress'] intent."). See also Blakey, supra note
2, at 240 (stating that the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the scope of a
statute must first be determined by examining its text).
138. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plain
language of the RICO securities fraud predicate offense.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). RICO defines any "person" as "any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." Id. § 1961(3).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1988).
141. "If Congress wanted to narrow the class of persons entitled to sue,... narrow-
ing the definition of 'person' in this section was all it took to achieve that objective..."
G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to
Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End
of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 935 n.232 (1990).
142. See International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1987)
(omitting § 1964(c) from analysis and interpreting "fraud in the sale of securities"
alone); In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
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In addition, both the literal language faction and the lOb-5 faction
ignore the plain language of RICO's liberal construction provision.143
In that provision, Congress mandated a broad judicial interpretation of
RICO because of RICO's remedial nature. 1" Thus, the plain language
of RICO contravenes the judicial imposition of a purchaser-seller
limitation.145
While ignoring RICO's plain language, the literal language faction
also incorrectly compares the word "in," from RICO's "fraud in the
sale of securities" provision with lOb-5's "in connection with" lan-
guage.146 This faction finds "in" to be narrower than "in connection
(same); Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191, 1193-94
(D. Utah 1989) (same); Kravetz v. Brukenfeld, 591 F. Supp. 1383, 1389-90 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (same); Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Res., Ltd., [1982 Decisions] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,742, at 93,738 (same) (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Spencer
Cos., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,361, at 92,215 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (same); But cf. Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990) (relying upon
§ 1964(c) to grant standing to sue under the RICO securities fraud predicate offense).
143. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the liberal
construction provision.
144. Id.
145. "If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a 'clearly ex-
pressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.'" United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). Courts may
only resort to legislative history where the statutory language is "inescapably ambigu-
ous." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring). The RICO securities fraud provision is unambiguous and gives stand-
ing to plaintiffs who can show a causal connection between the pattern of racketeering
activity and the damages suffered. See Macintosh, supra note 3, at 36. RICO simply
lacks any language suggesting a limitation similar to lob-5. Id. at 35. Thus, courts err
when they allow "an expression of policy to override what appear to be the clear words
of the statute." Id.
146. See supra note 136-40 and accompanying text for a discussion comparing the
language of the two fraud provisions. See also In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Sec. Li-
tig., 733 F. Supp. 668, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (" '[Fraud in the sale of securities' is quite
limited in comparison to the broader language Congress used in § 10(b) which prohibits
fraud 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' ").
Commentators also share the view that the RICO language is narrower than lOb-5's
language. See, e.g., Glanz, supra note 2, at 1525. ("Section 10(b) uses the phrase 'in
connection with,' implying a broader array of activities than the more limited 'in' found
in RICO."). However, Glanz contradicts himself on this issue:
The provision [RICO securities fraud] appears to suggest that almost all securities
cases can be brought under RICO. Securities fraud is a general term and is used to
characterize most violations of the securities laws. Hence, a broad reading of
"fraud in the sale of securities" makes virtually every violation of the securities law
a predicate act under RICO.
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with," 147 thereby ignoring congressional intent that RICO should be
construed liberally. Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that both
Congress and courts use the terms "in" and "in connection with" inter-
changeably.1 48 Therefore, Congress' use of "in" in the RICO securities
fraud provision does not indicate that a narrow reading is appropri-
ate. 49 Certainly, this difference in language between 1Ob-5 and RICO
does not justify judicial limitation of a congressionally mandated cause
of action. 150
B. Comparisons of RICO and 10b-5
Apart from inaccurately comparing the language of RICO and
lOb-5, both the literal language and the lOb-5 factions neglect several
fundamental differences between the two substantive provisions. First,
lOb-5 is a judicially-implied private cause of action, while RICO secur-
ities fraud is an express private cause of action. 151 As the Supreme
Court noted in Blue Chip Stamps, there are crucial differences between
the two types of actions. 152 When Congress expressly legislates a cause
of action, courts are bound to follow its mandate. 5 3
Second, courts also misrepresent the policy arguments behind the
lOb-5 purchaser-seller limitation. In interpreting lOb-5, the Blue Chip
Id. at 1516 (footnote omitted). This contradiction illustrates the limited viability of the
RICO lOb-5 language comparison argument.
147. Although many courts and commentators consider "in connection with" to be
an "elastic nexus requirement," the fact remains that 10b-5 standing requirements pre-
vent a large class of plaintiffs from seeking damages for fraud. Mathews, RICO in Se-
curities Litigation, supra note 16, at 945. Thus, while "in connection with" may be
interpreted broadly, lOb-5 standing is not interpreted broadly. Indeed, if "in" is more
narrow in scope than "in connection with," RICO securities fraud is a virtual nullity.
This would certainly contravene congressional intent. See MacIntosh, supra note 3, at
36 (admitting that "Congress intended radical surgery, through RICO, on a vexing
problem").
148. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 n.4 (1979).
149. Id.
150. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975)(reasoning that an expansive interpretation of a lOb-5 cause of action was acceptable
because the action is judicially implied).
151. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lOb-5
private cause of action.
152. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 748. The Supreme Court noted that, when
Congress expressly legislates a private cause of action, the judiciary must administer the
law as enacted. However, a judicially implied private cause of action may be delimited
in any manner by the courts until Congress addresses the question. Id. at 749.
153. Id. at 748.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol41/iss1/7
CIVIL RICO
Stamps Court balanced the concern for vexatious litigation with the
concern for providing a remedy for defrauded plaintiffs.154 The Court
recognized that the purchaser-seller limitation "unreasonably prevents
some deserving plaintiffs from recovering damages which have in fact
been caused by violations of lOb-5."'155 Indeed, the RICO securities
fraud claims dismissed in the cases above exemplify the potential dam-
ages caused by "fraud in the sale of securities" not sufficiently "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities." '56
However, courts limiting RICO securities fraud neglect the Blue
Chip Stamps balancing test and instead focus solely on fears of vexa-
tious litigation.'5 7 These courts overlook the fact that Congress
designed RICO to provide new weapons for defrauded plaintiffs.15 8
Congress added the securities fraud offense to RICO after hearing testi-
mony during congressional debate that fraud plagued the national se-
154. Id. at 740-49.
155. Id. at 743.
156. See, ag., International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 150-51 (4th
Cir. 1987) (involving a situation where the defendant allegedly defrauded the plaintiff
out of "at least $75,000"); In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668,
672-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (defendants engaged in a massive bribery scheme in addition to
lying to investors in shareholders' reports and press releases); Chief Consol. Mining Co.
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191, 1192-93 (D. Utah 1989) (defendant alleg-
edly filed a false stock prospectus when offering for sale to the public 1,893,111 shares of
stock at $3.75 per share). The court dismissed each of these claims without examining
the merits of the complaint.
Further, in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir.
1990), the plaintiff claimed that the defendant defrauded investors of $14 million and
prompted the failure of two securities brokerage firms. Stephen Wermiel, Top Court to
Decide If Investors Can File RICO Lawsuit in Securities Fraud Cases, WALL ST. J., Apr.
23, 1991, at A2. If the Supreme Court reverses Vigman, this fraud claim also will not
be litigated.
157. See, eg., Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152-53 (failing to mention plaintiff's injury or
balancing test); In re Par, 733 F. Supp. at 682-84 (same); Chief Consol Mining Co., 725
F. Supp. at 1194 (same).
In Gutman v. Howard Say. Bank, 748 F. Supp. 254, 265 n.8 (D.N.J. 1990), the court
noted the Zepkin court's important omission. In Gutman, the court held that New
Jersey common law securities fraud does not contain the purchaser-seller limitation. Id.
at 266. In so holding, the court noted that the Zepkin dictum neglects this Blue Chip
Stamps balancing test:
[t]he dictum in Zepkin ... is refuted by the Supreme Court's own statement that
the existence of common law claims without a purchase or sale requirement attenu-
ates the injustice resulting from the imposition of the requirement in lob-5 claims.
Id. at 265 n.8 (citation omitted).
158. See, eg., MacIntosh, supra note 3, at 9 n. 11 ("Obviously the time has come
for a frontal attack on the subversion of our economic system by organized criminal
activities. That attack must begin, however, with the frank recognition that our present
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curities exchanges.159 Congress reasoned that RICO's securities fraud
offense would increase a plaintiff's capabilities in fighting securities
fraud. 160
Finally, courts placing limitations on RICO securities fraud frustrate
Congress' intent to augment RICO criminal enforcement with civil
RICO actions.1 61 Congress designed civil RICO specifically to com-
pensate victims while deterring criminal activity. 162  Criminal RICO
securities fraud actions are not burdened by the purchaser-seller limita-
tion.1 63 Similarly, courts should not circumvent congressional intent
by limiting civil RICO securities fraud with the purchaser-seller
limitation. '"
Moreover, courts limiting RICO securities fraud disregard the fun-
damental difference between RICO and lOb-5. RICO is a remedial
statute,1 65 whereas lOb-5 was designed as a criminal statute. When
Congress passed RICO, it envisioned an important role for civil liti-
laws are inadequate to remove criminal influences from legitimate endeavor organiza-
tions." (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 78-79 (1969))). Id.
See also supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes of
RICO.
159. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of RICO securities fraud.
160. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1980) (stating that the pur-
pose of RICO was to allow Congress to address a large and seemingly neglected prob-
lem because existing law, state and federal, was inadequate to address the problem).
161. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' intent to
supplement criminal prosecutions with civil actions in RICO.
162. G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Re-flections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective
Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 530 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Equitable Relie!] (stating that RICO's civil provisions create a private enforcement
mechanism to compensate victims while deterring violators).
163. See, eg., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983) (denying
the plaintiff standing to sue under RICO securities fraud despite the defendant's prior
criminal conviction for the same conduct); Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. Sunshine Min-
ing Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (D. Utah 1989) (citing Moss and companion criminal
case, United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), for the proposition that
criminal RICO prosecutions are immune from the purchaser-seller limitation).
Similarly, lob-5 criminal prosecutions are immune from the purchaser-seller limita-
tion. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 n.6 (1979) (stating that Blue Chip
Stamps applies only to civil actions, not criminal actions).
164. See, e.g., Chief ConsoL Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. at 1194 (holding that the
purchaser-seller requirement applies only to civil RICO actions and denying defrauded
plaintiff relief).
165. RICO is primarily a remedial or civil statute. "[Tihe criminal provisions are
intended primarily as an adjunct to the civil provisions which I consider as the more
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gants as "private attorneys general." 166 Indeed, civil RICO litigants
utilize the same provisions as criminal prosecutors. 67 Conversely,
Congress did not originally intend lOb-5 to contain a private cause of
action.' 68 Although criminal prosecutors utilize the express provisions
of lOb-5, civil litigants access lOb-5 solely through judicial
implication. 169
Therefore, civil RICO securities fraud actions are not analogous to
civil lOb-5 actions. Rather, civil RICO securities fraud is similar to
criminal RICO and criminal lOb-5 securities fraud actions which both
lack the purchaser-seller limitation. 7' To effectuate Congress' careful
enforcement plan, RICO civil actions must garner the same freedom
from judicial limitation as RICO criminal actions.' 7 1
C. Judicial Imposition of the 10b-5 Limitation: The Truth Behind
the Rhetoric
Courts articulate many reasons for limiting civil RICO securities
fraud. In truth, however, these courts use the 10b-5 purchaser-seller
limitation simply to shield corporations from RICO claims.' 72 These
important feature of the bill." 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Roman L.
Hruska regarding S. 1623).
166. Bridges, supra note 2, at 44. Civil litigants are crucial to combatting white
collar crime because "federal investigative and prosecutorial resources for major finan-
cial institution fraud and embezzlement investigations and prosecutions [are] inade-
quate." House Committee Report Criticized Justice, FBI Actions on Thrift Fraud,
Banking Report (BNA) vol. 55, No. 21., at 854 (Nov. 26, 1990). "[L]ow wages among
various federal enforcement agencies... contribute to rapid turnover... [causing] ...
serious delays and fewer major fraud cases." Id.
167. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of RICO's statu-
tory language. See also Bridges, supra note 2, at 44 (stating that the combination of
criminal and civil causes of action put prosecutors and plaintiffs in alliance).
168. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729.
169. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the judicial
implication of the lOb-5 private cause of action.
170. See MacIntosh, supra note 3, at 68 (asserting that the soundest approach is to
construe RICO alike in both the civil and criminal contexts).
171. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text for a proposal rejecting the
purchaser-seller limitation and adopting RICO criminal securities fraud requirements
for civil RICO actions.
172. See, eg., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 526 (1984) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("RICO ... has been used more often against respected businesses with no
ties to organized crime, than against the mobsters who were the clearly intended target
of the statute."); International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir.
1987) ("This circuit has been especially sensitive to the disruption of business activity by
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courts succumb to the belief that white collar crime is somehow less
culpable than other crime."' Moreover, these courts overlook the
drastic effect white collar criminals have on society.1 74
By limiting RICO securities fraud, courts also seek to deter plaintiffs
from abusing RICO.175 However, RICO critics overstate the extent of
RICO abuse. 176 When Congress enacted RICO, it balanced the con-
cern of civil abuse with the concern for enhancing law enforcement
capabilities. 17 7 Therefore, when courts depart from RICO's plain lan-
lawsuits designed to poison the atmosphere with accusations of fraud.. ."); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that civil RICO actions
against "respected and legitimate enterprises" are extraordinary, if not outrageous);
Spencer Cos., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,361, at 92,217 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) ("Among other things, a defendant
may be exposed to pretrial discovery of every aspect of its business for a ten-year
period.").
173. Euphemisms like 'commercial disputes,' 'commercial frauds,' 'garden variety
frauds' and 'technical violations' ... are sanitized phrases often used by 'legitimate
businesses and individuals' to distinguish their frauds from the 'real' frauds perpe-
trated by 'real' crooks. Yet all willful fraudulent conduct has in common the ele-
ments of premeditation, planning, motivation, execution over time and injury to
victims and commerce.
Blakey & Cessar, supra note 162, at 569-70 n.193 (quoting Oversight on Civil RICO
Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-11 (1985)
(testimony of Mr. Phillip A. Feign, spokesman for the North American Securities Ad-
ministrators Association)).
174. Id. at 570 n.193 (white-collar crime defrauds Americans of about $200 billion
dollars a year). See also U.S. Reports 18% Rise in '85 In White-Collar Convictions; N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1987, at A24 (In 1985, charges for federal white collar crimes involved
approximately $800 million, robbery losses reported to the police amounted to slightly
more than $300 million).
175. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1987)
(stating that the danger of vexatious litigation is even greater in RICO treble damage
suits); Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (D.
Utah 1989) ("RICO plaintiffs should not be allowed... to [engage in] judicial system
abuse.").
176. Kenneth F. McCallion, RICO "Abusive'? The Charge Is a Fraud; Congress
Shouldn't Tamper with the Provision that Allows Consumers to Sue for Triple Damages,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1989, at 69 (finding that specific examples of RICO abuse are rare
and that although over 1.9 million cases were filed in federal court from 1979 to 1988, a
business coalition lobbying Congress to amend RICO could only produce 53 examples
of alleged RICO "abuse"); Blakey and Cessar, supra note 162, at 534 n.29 (stating that
out of approximately 275,000 suits filed each year, only 1,069 suits in 1986 were RICO
cases, and 294 of these were terminated prior to trial).
177. See, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984)
("Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concerned to avoid
opening loopholes [for offenders] ... than to avoid making garden-variety frauds action-
able in federal treble damage proceedings - the price of eliminating of all possible
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guage and place limitations on RICO, they substitute judicial lawmak-
ing for legislative lawmaking. 17 8 Congress alone may limit RICO
securities fraud if it deems the limitation prudent.'7 9 Congress' liberal
application mandate is still in effect for civil RICO cases; courts are
well-advised to follow it.
CONCLUSION
Standing to sue for RICO securities fraud should be limited only by
the requirements of criminal RICO securities fraud.' 0 Consistent
loopholes."); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1354-55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Schect, 464 U.S. 100 (1983) ("Congress chose to pro-
vide civil remedies for an enormous variety of conduct, balancing the need to redress a
broad social ill against the virtue of a tight, but possibly overly astringent, legislative
draftsmanship.").
178. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 53-54 (1980) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed his views on the judiciary's role in interpreting statu-
tory language. Rehnquist stated:
I disagree... that... Congress must make some affirmative showing that it
intends its action to provide such redress before this Court will deem Congress'
action to be an adequate substitute for an inferred remedy. The requirement...
subverts the policy making authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislative
Branch.... [Tihe Court's attempt to ascertain Congressional intention... demon-
strates that the creation of [the purchaser-seller limitation] involves policy consid-
erations that are more appropriately made by the Legislative rather than the
Judicial Branch of our Government.... [W]hen Congress creates and defines the
limits of a cause of action, it has taken into account competing considerations and
struck what it considers to be an appropriate balance among them. ... [I]t is
wholly at odds with... the constitutional notion of separation of powers.., for
this Court to exercise free rein in fashioning additional rules for recovery of dam-
ages....
Id. at 53-54 (footnote omitted).
179. Congress has attempted to amend RICO several times since 1985. In 1985,
Representative Rick Boucher introduced a bill which would add a prior criminal con-
viction requirement to the civil provisions of RICO. Geoffrey F. Aronow, In Defense of
Sausage Reform: Legislative Changes to Civil RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 964, 966
(1990). The House passed the bill, but the Senate defeated the measure by three votes.
Id. at 966-67 n.21.
More recently, Senator Hughes of New Jersey introduced H.R. 1717, which requires
judges to act as "gatekeepers" of civil RICO claims. Barbara Franklin, "RICO Reform
-Again," N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1991, at 5. The bill requires courts to limit the use of civil
RICO to proceedings "in the public interest" which deter only "egregious criminal con-
duct." Id. Further, the bill mandates that courts allow RICO claims only where "ap-
propriate," given the magnitude of the injury. Id. Finally, the defendant must be a
"major participant" in the activity causing the plaintiff's injury. Id. Given the hostility
judges feel towards RICO, the "gatekeeper" reform bill would end the use of RICO in
civil suits. Id. at 6.
180. A civil RICO plaintiff must first prove the elements of securities fraud. The
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with § 1964(c), standing should be limited to plaintiffs injured "by rea-
son of" a securities fraud violation."' 1 This standing proposal main-
tains a narrow class of RICO securities fraud plaintiffs absent any
judicially implied limitations.182 More importantly, this standing pro-
posal maximizes enforcement of the RICO securities fraud provision
against white collar criminals worthy of RICO's bite.183
Thomas W. Alvey, 111*
plaintiff must prove that the defendant misstated or failed to disclose a material fact,
that the defendant intended to deceive, and that the plaintiff reasonably relied on and
was injured by the misstatement or omission. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1510
(11th Cir. 1991).
In addition, to prove a RICO violation, the plaintiff must establish that the defend-
ant engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) and 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text for the require-
ments of RICO.
Finally, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988), the plaintiff must prove that his
injuries occurred "by reason of" the defendant's securities fraud violations. See supra
note 128 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "by reason of" requirement as
described in Vigman.
181. Adoption of the proposed standing requirement makes RICO securities fraud
consistent with mail and wire fraud under § 1964(c) which grants standing to plaintiffs
injured "by reason of" the mail or wire fraud violation. See Pelletier, 921 F.2d at 1506.
See supra note 128 for a discussion of the "by reason of" limitation in RICO § 1964(c).
182. See supra note 180 for a discussion of the elements of criminal RICO securities
fraud. These elements, coupled with the "by reason of" limitation in RICO, signifi-
cantly narrow the class of plaintiffs which may bring a RICO securities fraud suit. See
also supra notes 118-36 for a discussion of Vigman's limits on RICO securities fraud
standing.
183. Even if the Supreme Court does not limit RICO securities fraud in Vigman,
Congress may limit it. An impressive coalition of business groups, including accounting
and securities organizations, has lobbied vigorously in Congress to amend RICO since
1985. The money and political power of this coalition virtually insures RICO's legisla-
tive limitation. It would be a cruel irony if these business groups acted "[t]o deprive
consumers of an opportunity to recover multiple damages for fraud while... [business
groups may still] sue for treble damages under the anti-trust laws .... ." Kenneth
McCallion, RICO Abusive? The Charge is a Fraud- Congress Shouldn't Tamper with
the Provision that Allows Consumers to Sue for Triple Damages, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20,
1989, at 69.
It would also be a cruel irony if so-called legitimate businesses such as accounting
firms and securities firms decreased the remedies available to defrauded consumers, in
light of the current savings and loan crises, insurance crises and insider trading crises.
See, e.g., Herb Greenberg, E.F Hutton Admits Check Rigging Broker Netted $1 Billion,
Faces $2 Million Fine, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1985, at C1 (E.F. Hutton & Co. pleaded
guilty to 2,000 counts of intentionally rigging checks to defraud investors of over $1
billion); S&L Fraud Sentences Average 3.2 Years; Thrifts: The Justice Department Says
Federal Cases in General Typically Draw 2.5 Year Terms, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 4,
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1990, at D5 (president of First Maryland Savings and Loan embezzled at least $60
million from his bank); WALL ST. J., May 6, 1991, at C9 (court orders Prudential Ins.
Co. to pay $I million in punitive damages for maliciously and recklessly defrauding 74
year-old retired housewife); Most People Wary of Executives Poll, CH. TRIB., June 10,
1985 at CI0 (survey shows that majority of Americans believe that corporate executives
are dishonest and that white collar crime is frequent).
* J.D. 1992, Washington University.
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